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MORAL RISK AND SHARE VALUE:
THE CASE OF IBl\il AND HITACHI
Dale 0. Cloninger

T RODUCTION :
Thb ~tudy wa, a continuation of the queM for a possible rationale for firm~
use of unfair. i.e. illegal. business practices. Cloninger (41 ha, ,hown that
economic gains could accrue to the firm a, a result of unfair business practices
under certain ,pccifiec.J conditions The fact this possibility existed did not
necessarily explain any or all uses of unfair business practice since ind1v1dual
economic gains to those persons direct); involved could abo explain their use.
The presumption of this study was that such practices were employed for
someone's deliberate economic gain as oppo~d to ,ome other \OC1ological cause(s)
that might be ascribed to individual criminal behavior since either shareholders
or manager, could benefit from these actions.
The purpo,e of this paper was an attempt to c.Jeterm1ne the apparent beneficiary
of certain unfair practices in the ca,e of IBM and H1tach1. ~o broad generalizations could he drawn as a re,ult of this study since the motives for a particular
set of unfair business practices could \'ary from ca\C to ca,e. The detern11nat10n
of those motives on a case-by-case basl\ could ha\e an important hearing on the
as,e\\ment of sanctions. Penalt1c, against the specific ind1v1dual, resp1ms1hle could
be Justified regardlc,, of who was the rec1p1ent of the economic gain, Howe\ er.
significant sanctions against the firm (shareholders) might onl) be appropriate
whim: shareholder, \\ere the beneficiaries of the gains.
Recent Re,eart·h
Strachan. Smith and Berdle, (SSB) 1151 ha\e attempted to determine whether
share prices reacted to announcemrnts of alleged corporate crime b; uuhzing
a sample of lirm, reported h; Ro,, (131 - Their re,ult, md1.:ated that cquit) \ alue,
do fall on or about the announcement date, and wa, part1cularl) ,o for firm, engaged in alleged price fix111g scheme, and on thr date of the inlltal announl·ement.
While both th 1, and the present ,tud) wen: hoth concerned with the rea,llon of
stock value, a, of certain announcement dates there c~JSted ,ome 11nportant
di fferent·e,
First. SSB \\ere concerned \\ ith price rcacuon, immediately around the annount·ement date (t= -25 days tot= ..- 10 days). The prc-.cnt ,tud) was concerned with longer term price changes. It \\ a, possible that market valu" ma}
suffer from temporar) d1,locat1ons as an 1mmed1atc reartion IO puhlic: announcement, Price, could rcnl\'er 1f and when the effect, were ,hown IO be of
a nature that did not materially affect ,hare value,. Rea,on, for only 11.:mporary
reaction, arc given in a ,ubsequent scctmn of th" paper.
Second. the pre,ent ,tudy attempt, to interpret an) per,i,tcnt price change,
a, ev1Jcnt·e that maximizing shareholder, \\Calth Y.as a motive for corporate u,e
of illegal activites.

---------The most important differences. h~wever. were methodological. The SSB study
used the means ~dJusted approach with a "t" test to identify any possible significant differences in returns immediately prior to and after the announcement dates.
The present study utilized the familiar market model and tracked the behavior
of the cumulative average residual as well a~ the nature and stability of the empirical model prior to and after the announcement dates.
A ,econd methodological difference wa, the theoretical bases for the empirical
modeb. The present study wa, hascd on the work of Cloninger l4] who developed
a theoretical rationale for the corporate u,e of illegal behavior as discussed in
a subsequent ,ection of thi, paper. A, stated above, the market model was also
used- the theoretical underpinning, of which are well known in the field of finance.
The SSB ,tudy v.a, primarily empirical.
Third. the ,ample ,izc tliffrr, between the ,tudie,. The present study used a
Ca\C study approach compared to a cross sectional ,tudy of 84 events in the SSB
study. The stutlie\ complement each other in one respect. The SSB tests were
more general but the present ,tudy utilized an approach that was more microoriented in that ,pecific cvenb ,urrounding the announcement dates could be
analyzed.
Fnunh. the distinction of the u,e of corporate criminal activity for shareholder
gain vis-a-vis insider gain wa!, made in the pre,cnt ,tudy through a short discus\1on of tb1~ agency problem.
These difference, in purpo,e and method rnntrast the two ,tutlie,. The results.
on the other hand. complemented each other. The SSB study found evidence of
immediate price dislocations while the prc,cnt stud} found evidence of both immediate and per~istent price di~location,. The implica1ion~ of these disloca1ions
are d1,cu~~ed la1.:r in th1~ paper.
Criminal Behavior and The Agenc1 Problem
Jem,en and Mec kling [9] defined an agency rela1iomh1p a\" ... a contract under
which one or more pcr~on, ... engage another per~on ... lo perform some service on their behalf which involve~ delegating 5omc deci~ion making au1hority
to the agent. If both partie~ .. . arc utilit) ma)(imizer, 1hcrc 1, good rea,on to believe
the ag.:nt will nol always act Ill the be~I interest, of lhe principal. ... there will
be some divergence belv.een the agcnb decision~ and lhe de,-isions which would
maximize the welfare of the principal lgiv.:n oplimal monitoring and bonding activities]." The U\I! of illegal busine,s practices for the intendc<l gain of managers
could be con~idered. therefore, a, another form of the agency problem.
The question of illegal practice use may not be ,o easily resolved for several
reason\. First. their u,e could be in1endcd to maximize shareholder wealth and
1101, therefore, part of the agency problem. Second, Fama 18] recognized •h~•
model, Jevelopcd to handle agency problem, such a5 hi~ own may not apply in
certain instances. He stated, "There arc .. _ situation, where the weight of anticipated future wage changes is insufficient to cou n1erbalance the gains 10 _be
had from ex post shirking, or perhaps outright theft _... These situa1ions can ansc
where ___ a manager perceives that the value of his human capiial changes by

2

more than the wealth changes imposed on other factors (shareholders) ... by his
current deviations from the terms of the contract.''
Whether agency theory totally explains managerial use of unfair business practice
is unclear. This type of behavior could also be explained by the extensive economic
theory of criminal behavior developed by Becker [3], Ehrlich [7], Stigler [13]
and others. The nature of the behaviorial theory which explains individual manager
decisions to u,e unfair business practice for their own gain was irrelevent for
the present ,tudy. This study attempted to demonstrate how evidence of who
benefits (insiders vis-a-vis shareholders) from the corporate use of illegal activity could be determined using residual analysis.
The preceding discussion of the agency problem was not meant to be exhaustive
but illustrative of the rclation,hip of the agency problem and corporate decisions
to participate in illegitimate activities. The reader is referred to the growing body
of literature on the agency problem for further insights.
Moral Risk and Share Value
Moral risk has been defined by Cloninger HI as " ... the rbk of exposure,
including arre,t and conviction for illegitimate acts. of a wide range of activities
involving illegal. immoral. unethical or unfair busine~, practice~." Moral risk
together with business and financial ri~k make up the total risk of the firm ·s operations. Moral nsk affccb bu,iness risk through the impact the former may have
on the variability of anticipated cash flows. Total ri,k will increase or decrease
depending upon the nature of the effect of unfair busincs, practices on bw,incss
risk. That is. the men: presence of moral risk need not increase the firm·, total
risk exposure if in fact the unfair husines~ practices reduce business risk more
than the concommitant increa~c in moral risk.
Cloninger showed that there are ranges of probabilit) of cxpo,urc for unfair
bu,incs, practice, which will produce a ,ufficient reduction in bu,ines, risk to
offset the moral ri~k incurred. Thus. the po,,ibility exists that the firm could
benefit. under ce rtain conditiom. from the us.: of unfair bminc5, practice,. These
conditions would include: 1) a suffic iently low probability of exposure: 2) no
perception by the market of the cxi,tcnc.: of unfair busine,, practice,: and 3)
unfair practice, that were , ufficiently t'ffcctive to reduce bu,incss ri,k enough
to lower the firm·, total risk. That is. if all of these cond ition, "ere met. ccteris
paribu5. the , harcholder rnuld benefit through the increa,e in the \,:.due of the
firm's ,hares a, a re~ult of the reduction in the firm·, ri,k due to what i, perceived. albeit incorm.:tly. to be legitimate busine,s practices.
Whether Shareholders actually benefit depend, on a fourth condition - the
perception of a reduction in total risk by the marl,.et in the ab,cnce of knowledge
of its exact ,ource. Insiders (management and/or other, privy to internal firm
operation,) may conceal any ri,k reduction or the nature of the acb may simply
prohibit any knowledge of their bencfib from b.:ing transferred to individuab
outside the ti rm.
The purpose of thi, study was to determine. via a case study. the partie, who
appeared to have benefited from the use of unfair business practices, i.e. insiders

3

-----or shareholJers. The case chosen for this purpose was the IBM-Hitachi episode
in which certain officials of Hitachi were indicted for the allegeJ illegal purchase
of corporate ~ecrcts belonging to IBM. The thrust of thb analysis was to trace
the behavior of the price of Hitachi ,tock both prior to and after the issuance
of inJictments and their puhlic announcement.
In the absence of prior knowlcJgc hy the puhlic (market) of the existence of
these practices and any as,ociateJ bcndits (expected return enhancement or risk
reJuction). the announcement of their discovery ,hould have no lasting significant impact on the share price. Since the market would have been unaware of
either the practices· exi,tcnce or any possible bcnetib. the ,hare price prior to
the disclo,urc could not have retkcteJ either. Unles, the ,anctions imposed against
the firm as a result of the discovery of these practices were significant. no lasting
or ,ub\tantial impact on ,hare \ alue \\ ould materialize.
If the rbl reJuc:tion benefits v.ere known to the market but perceived as being
the result ot astutc legitimate business prac:tice. i.e. the market lacked knowleJge
of their true ,ource. the discovery that they were the result of illegal acts could
lower the ,hare price in line with the value imputeJ by the market as a result
of the perceivcJ hcncfits. A lasting reduction in ,hare price could be interpreted
as eviJence that the market. prinr lll the di,clo,ure. wa, av.arc of the benefits
without being av. are of their exact or true ,oun:e. A lasting redui:tion in the price
coulJ abo be the result of any ,ub,tantial punitive ac:tion taken again~! the fi rm.
Thi, cfocu,,ion pre,ume, that no ,tate of the worlJ exist\ in which the market
knO\\, of illegal ach and enfori:emcnt authoritie, Jo not. Therefore. the Jiscovery
of the exi,tcncc of the practice, hy the market v.ould re,ult 111 appropriate action
h} the authorit1e, which may or may not have a la,ting effect on ,hare price
depending upon the market', prior perception, of the benefit,.
In the ca,e where the mari..ct is both un,n\arc of the u,c of the prai:tice, and
an} a"ociateJ benefit,. the gains c:oulJ ac:nuc. either hy intention or by default.
to in,iJer,. The moti\ation for thi.:,e acb could have been exclu,ively for the
benefit of the in,ider, re,pon,ihle for their u,e. A find ing of only a temporary
impact on ,hare prii:e a, a re,ult of the di,covcry of the use of the,c act, could
he interprcteJ as eviJencc in ,upport of a theory of 1n,iJer ··,elf-dealing". The
Jctermination ot the motive for using unfair bu,inc,, practice, i, important ,ince
ifprai:ticed for the ,hareholder·s benefit. punitive ai:tion again,t the lirin a, well
a, tho,c insiJer, rc,pon,ihle woulJ he appropriate. However. if used a, a ,elfserving practice hy in,ideP,, then punitive action against the ,pecific insiJ<!r,
rc,pomiblc and not the firm might be appropriate.
The ,hare price may not ,how any ,ignificant i:hange because the market
recognizes that any gain,(lo,,e,) to ,hareholder,, if realizeJ. will be negligible.
That is. C\en if ,hareholder-, did gain or lose. the amount of either could be so
,mall that any as,ociateJ price change would abo he ,mall.
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The Model
The model used in this study followed the form as expressed by Mandelker ( 11].
E(S) = A + BM + U
( 1)
where E(S) is an index of expected return of ~ome firm (j). M is an index of
market returns, A and B are. respectively. the intercept and slope coefticien15
and U is the error term. The empirical model utilized in this study was of the form,
E(H) = a + bN + e
(2)
or. more specifically,
(3)
logE(h) = a+ blog(n) + e
where E(H) represents an index rnea,ure of expected return on Hitachi stock and
N is a mea~urc of market returns using the NYSE Composite Index. The empirical test used the logarithm~ of the variables and included an analysis of the
residual s of equation (3) both prior to and after certain critical dates as outlined
below. The tests abo included an analysis of the empirical model itself to determine if the nature or ,tructure of the model changed as a result of certain events
in the hbtory of Hitachi operations.
The prc;umptions of the;c te, 1; were. if the nature of the rc;iduals and the
model itself changed in rc,pome to certain e vent;, ,hareholders of Hitachi stock
would be impacted by tho;e events through change, in the ,hare price. These
rcspon;e, could be evidence that ;hareho lder, were the recipient; of gain;(losses)
attributed to action~ by the firm 's manager, and. thu,. could have been the motive
for the,c action;. If the re;idual, were ,hown to be randomly di,tributed both
heforc and after the event;. and if the nature of the model were not ;ignificantly
thfferent. then it could be concluded that shareholder,· wealth v. a, unaffected
by the actions and, thu;, not the motive for their u;e.

IBM and Hitachi
On June 22. 1982 ofticiab of Hitachi Ltd. \\Cre arre\ted and ;ubsequemly indicted on charges that they allegedly conspired to tran~port to Japan trade secrets
,tolen from International Bu~inc~, Machine, Corporation. A federal grand jury
issued indictment~ again,! the officab on June 30. 1982. On February 8. 1983
two of tho~c officials pleaded guilty to charge~ of conspiring to transport stolen
,ecreh from IBM to Japan. Hitachi Ltd. was fined $10.000. A civil suit by IBM
again;t Hitachi Ltd. wa, ,1111 pending at that tlfne .
The amount of the fine imposed on Hitachi wa~ relatively ,mall in light of the
firm's size. a 1982 e~timatcd net worth of SSA billion according to the July 30
1982 VALUE LINE. Thus. the fine itself would have a negligible effect on Hitachi
Ltd . ~tock. Share price could also fall a~ a reaction hy the market to an anticipated
adverse civil suit ,cttlement. In addition, if the market perceives the June 22.
1982. disclo,ure~ as impacting Hitachi'~ future ability to effectively compete in
it~ traditional markets. then share value could be affected to whatever extent the
market helieved appropriate . Thus. the real fine would be the decrement m ~hare
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value as a result of the disclosures plus any unanticipated sanctions imposed by
the authorities.
The <lecreased share value. if any. coul<l result because investors perceived
the in<lictments as (I) cvi<lence that similar practices had some positive effect
on share value in the paM but the <lbclosure, restricte<l the future use of these
practices. thus. lowering share values; (2) events that taint the public image of
the firm to an extent that customers arc less likely to carry on '·business-as-usual,"
thus. adversely impacting the firm·s future earnings capacity; and (3) actions subjecting the firm to fines an<l/or civil <lamage claims. It is possible, then, for share
value to <lecline for n:ason, other than investors believing that unfair business
practices were stan<lard but un<lisclosed operating proce<lure. That is, the decrease
in share value may also represent reduced expecte<l future earnings due to factors other than the belief that paM ~hare value was attributable. in part, to the
use of unfair business practices.
The Empirical Test
Weeki~ <lata on Hitachi Lt<l . ,hare prices v.cre obtained from Value Line fot
a period of approximate!} 500 weeb . Weeki) readings of the NYSE Composit~
ln<lc, for even a longer period were obtatned from The Nev. York Stock Exchange. The H1tach1 <lata rcvcale<l a ,omewhat consistent pattern based on analysis
of res1<luab up until late 1981 v.hen ih ,hare price began to rise to a higher level.
It ,, as apparent that these movements coul<l be capture<l adequately with 200 week·
ly observations ending v.,ith June 16. 198:? (six day~ prior to the arrests). An ad·
<litional 37 weekly ob,ervations were obtained from current 1,sucs ol THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL in order to track Hitachi ,hare prices ,ubsequent to the in•
<lictments. The :?00 v.eekly ob,ervations in<l1cated, from analy~is of residual!
,hov.n m Figure I A. three <listinct period~ of 1ntere~t: the fmt 135 period~ where
the re,1duab wen: ,omewhat cyclical but fairly \table: an approximately 20 week
period in wh1rh the re,1dual~ rn,e ~uh~tant1ally: and a 45 week period m v. hich
,ome cychcal beha\Jor reiurned but at a higher level. The middle period of 20
weeks v.-a, removed from the data an<l the I 35 week period a<lju,ted for the difference, in scale bet\,ecn the two remaining periods. Figure IB ,how, the re,idual
plot for thi~ a<lJu,tc<l 180 wee~ period. Separate empirical modeb were developed
for each of th<'! 135 an<l .is week period~. In addition. modcb were dcvelopec
for the entire 180 week pcrio<l just prior to the indictment, and the 82 week period
cnn,i,ting nf thc .is v.cck period prior to the indictments and 37 weeks nnmediatel)
after the 1n<l1ctmcnh. Thc,e modch are summarized in Table I.
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FIGURE lA

RESIDUALS. HITACHI - NYSE COMPOSITE INDEX
200 week model (no. 200 = 06/16/82)
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TABLE I
Regre~~ion Model\ of H1tach1 and NYSE
I.

Model
135 week

a
. 113
(.24)

b
.976
(9.8 1)

Sc
. 140

r,4nJ
.415

2.

45 week

-3.066
(-2.28)

1.655
(5.78)

.094

.424

3.

180 week

-.052
(-. I:!}

1.01
(11.19)

.130

.409

-. IO
( -. 16)

(7 .81 l

. 114

.425

4.

82 week

1.01

"t'' Matbtic\ g1vc:n in parenthe~e~.
There appear, to be a \ub,1ant1al differc:nce between the 135 week and 45 week
modeb. Stat1~tical te~t, indicate at the .05 level that the 45 week model vanes
significant!) from the I80 week H11ach1 c:xperience while the 135 week model
doe~ not. The~c re~ulh are evidence that the 45 week model wa~ drawn from
a different population than the 135 wed. model.
The 82 week model re~emhles closely the entire 180 week H1tach1 experience.
Both modeb indicate that the mten:ept term i\ not ~1gnificantly different from
Lero and that. \ince the variable\ are in logarithmic form, a given percentage
change in the market return result~ in a corresponding change in Hitachi returns.
Modeb (2) and (3) were u,ed a, the ba,i, for projecting future Hitachi ~hare
prices. These proJection~ were then compared v. ith actual share price~ and the
differences compared with past rcsiduab for an) po~~ihle d1~conform11ie~. Figure
2 show~ the re~idual pattern for the last 36 week\ of the 45 and I 80 week models.
Figure J shows the pattern of differences between actual and proJected H11ach1
share price~ smce the issuance of the initial mdictmenh. II wa~ appan:nt that the
residual patterns did not repeat thcm..ehcs in the 37 week po,t indictment period.
That is, based on the pre and post mdictment experience. there was an apparent
change in the nature of the residual patterns. Both mndeb produced consistently
negative differences throughout the 37 week po~t indictment period -...ith the 45
model ne\er above zero.
The 82 week model which extended through the indictment week revealed a
rc,idual pattern c-onsi~tent w1th the po,t indictment difference~ of actual minu~
proJected share prices a~ found in the 45 and I 80 wed. modeh. The 82 week
model produced a re5idual pattern that wa, primarily (74 percent} above zero
in the fir~t 45 weeh prior to the indictment~ and primarily (75 percent) below
1ero the laM 36 week.\ after the indictment,. Thb pattern is reproduced 1n Figure 4.
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FIGURE 2

HITACHI PESIDUALS

0. -=:0------------------0.23

('1 • 1..:
,_,
- - -

t.1.

. ···········
.............. ··············· ..... ···············
············
··················
·····

u·, ·........... ···...... . ........

n

n

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~b·

!J(•............ ... t ' .........................,V--+-

i'ti&.-1

- ~J.
~1L
...::,_:_~~·· ......r;i.

-I~' [1~ .

-u. 1l.

-c~. 19

. .

.J .~. . .fl .....................................t~. . . i:l~. ..................
\

:t/,

.

.~ .

·w.... . . .. . . . . .

....... ............................................................

-0 . .2t, ................................................. · ..................................................

-0. -:S3 ....................................................................................................... .
-0.40L-_ _ __...,_ _ _ _~•- - - - ~·- - - - -

-40

-30
-JU
-10
PERIODS BEFORE INDICTMENTS
4~ WEEK MODEL • 180 WEEK MODEL

7
FIGURE 3

((1

w
i" ·1
:z:
w
Ct::
w

LL
LL

PROJECTED US. ACTUAL
0.30. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
0.23
0 . 16
(1 . 0'3

....
0

Ct::
LL

L

-0. *j L - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - 0

10

20

30

WEEKS SINCE INDICTMENTS

FIGURE 4
RESIDUAL - 82 WEEK MODEL
.,o

-

10

- ,o

_ __ ____ Residents

**********"*** Cumulative
Average
Re,iduab

"nuu.

. 06/lllll 1

Run, tc,t~ indicated that a hypothe,i~ of normally di,tributcd re,iduab for each
of
the five model, could be rejected \\ 1th probable error, of le,, than .01. However.
1
the u,ual cyclical pattern of re~iduab witnc,,ed in the pre-indictment period model,
wa~ not !ound in the latter 37 weeb of the 82 period model. The previou~ cyclical
period averaged approximately 20 wceb from beginning to end.

Ba,ed on the pre and pmt indictment change in the ,tnicturc of the empirical
model,. the rnmpari,on~ of rc,1dual pattern, before. aft.:r and through the indi-:tment period. it wa, apparent that there wa~ evidence that the pricing rclation,hip between H1tach1 and the market had h.:cn ,uh,tantiall~ and per~i,tently altered
on or about the week the indicl!nenh \\ere i,,u.:d.
Thi, evidence \\a, rnn,i,ti.:nt with the hyputhe,i~ that ,harchold.:r, were
benefiting from pre-di,clo,urc practice, at lca,t relative to the e,perience ,ince
the dbclo,ure of the natLJl'l' of ,omc of tl10,c practice,. The evidence would abo
he rnn,i,tcnt \\ ith the h;pothe,i, that ,harcholdcr w.:alth wa, the motive for tho,e
di~clo,ed practice,. Givi.:n the pre,umption that thc~c practices \\ere uti111ed for
~omeonc's economic gain, the evidence ~upporh the rnm:lu~ion that th.:
~harcholdcr~ were among thlN: who gained from their u~c and/or ~uffcred from
their di~clo~ure.
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Po,t,cript

Thi.: above material wa, written prior to thi.: publication of the FORTUNE anich: by Tinnin [ 16]. The tentati,e conclu,ion, drawn above arc. in the author's
opinion. con,i,tcnt with the tenor of the Tinnin article,, hich ,ought to trace the
evcnt, and circumstance, ,urrounding the arre,t,. indictmcnb and guilty plea!
entcrcd on bi.:half of th,: tkfcndant,. That is. ,harcholder wealth (,hare price)
may have mdei.:J been the motive for !hi.: di,clo,l'J practice,.
A recent NI:: WSWf: EK article by Pauly. Willen,on and Gibney I 121 report!
rumor, of an Hitachi 113!\I acrnrJ in which part of the ,ettlcmcnt of the civil sui1 ·
by 18!\I woulJ be a licen,ing agreement allowing IBM into more of the Japancsi
enmputer rnarki.:t and Hitad11 a ,hare nf the return, of that venture. Such an agree :
th<
ment would rnodif) :my reduction in ,hare price due 10 othcr factor,. If
n:ma1n111g decrement in ,hare price could not be attributed 10 any anticipate(
ad, cr,c juJgcmenl in the ch ii ,uit.
I
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